Foreign troops help Putin avoid pitfalls of another Russian mobilization

Reports emerged in November of further efforts by the Kremlin to recruit foreign fighters for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to the Financial Times, a Houthi-linked company has provided Russia with hundreds of Yemeni mercenaries. Recruits traveled to Russia where they were promised high salaries and Russian citizenship before being sent to the front lines in Ukraine.

Such claims are not new. The Kremlin has reportedly been using foreign fighters since the early stages of the invasion in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of mobilizing fresh troops at home. Moscow is accused of conducting recruitment in a number of low income countries throughout the Global South. Russia’s efforts in Cuba and India have been slammed by critics as human trafficking operations. Nepal has proved particularly vulnerable to Russian recruitment, with estimates ranging from a few thousand to 15,000 men signing up to fight in Ukraine.

The Putin regime has also allegedly targeted vulnerable populations within its own borders. This summer, the Russian authorities rounded up more than 30,000 migrants with Russian citizenship who had failed to register for military service. Many were subsequently sent to Ukraine.

Recruitment efforts have been conducted at Russian immigration detention centers holding migrant workers mainly from Central Asian countries. An October 2024 report by RFE/RL claimed that Russian officials have made prison conditions unbearably harsh and inhumane in an effort to pressure inmates into joining the military. “They keep you in a cold cell, you sleep on the floor with just a pillow underneath you holding plastic bottles filled with hot water to keep warm,” according to one Kyrgyz inmate.

While many foreign fighters have reported being pressured or misled by Russian recruiters, others are enticed by the promise of relatively high salaries and the prospect of a Russian passport. As of November 2024, Russia had granted citizenship to more than 3,000 foreigners in exchange for military service.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The issue of foreign troops fighting for Russia has hit the headlines in recent weeks following news that North Korea has sent approximately ten thousand soldiers to join the invasion of Ukraine. Many see this as a watershed moment in the war, due to the number of troops involved and the official nature of the deployment. Given the vast size of the North Korean armed forces, there is clearly considerable scope for Pyongyang to send many more men.

Moscow’s enthusiasm for foreign fighters is easy to understand. As the war grinds on and approaches the three-year mark, Russia appears to be facing mounting manpower challenges. While the Kremlin does not release official information on the scale of its losses in Ukraine, most estimates indicate hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed or seriously wounded during the invasion. According to the UK Ministry of Defense, November 2024 was the deadliest month of the war so far, with Russia suffering more than 45,000 casualties.

The grim prospects for Russian troops in Ukraine are making it harder to attract volunteers. In response, the Russian authorities have recently begun offering greater financial incentives for new recruits as well as generous compensation for the families of those killed in action.

Despite these efforts, there are indications that the Russian military is now dangerously overextended. When Ukraine launched a surprise cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast in summer 2024, Russia initially had to rely on an improvised defense made up largely of young conscripts, many of whom were taken prisoner. More recently, Russia’s inability to save its Syrian client Bashar Assad underlined Moscow’s lack of reserves.

With his own army fully committed in Ukraine and experiencing heavy losses, Putin is running out of options as he seeks to shield Russians from the consequences of his invasion. For much of the war, the Kremlin has focused its domestic recruitment efforts on lower income and ethnic minority regions of Russia, while also enlisting large numbers of prisoners. Such tactics avoided touching more prosperous regions to prevent protests or rallies. However, these sources of manpower are not infinite.

Putin remains determined to avoid a repeat of his September 2022 mobilization order, which proved highly unpopular and led to an exodus from Russia as hundreds of thousands fled military service. With the supply of prisoners drying up and fewer Russians prepared to volunteer for a war that many see as a meat grinder, his best option may now be to seek increasing numbers of foreign troops.

The implications of foreign soldiers fighting in Russia’s invasion extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. Growing collaboration between the Houthis and Russia has raised alarm bells in recent weeks, with the US Special Envoy for Yemen reporting that Moscow could begin weapons transfers to the rebel group to allow it to more effectively carry out attacks on Western shipping in the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the consequences of North Korea’s entry into the war are an even greater cause for concern. Fighting in Ukraine presents a rare opportunity for North Korean soldiers to gain valuable experience of modern warfare, including innovations such as the use of drones. Pyongyang is also expected to receive significant military support from Russia that could enhance its missile, nuclear, and naval capabilities. Unsurprisingly, South Korea is monitoring the situation with growing unease.

Russia’s use of foreign troops is a dangerous trend that promises to prolong the war and has the potential to fuel international instability. It is also a sign that while Putin is not yet running out of Russian recruits, he would prefer to seek manpower elsewhere to sustain the costly human wave tactics employed by the Russian army in Ukraine.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Image: Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a meeting of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects at the Kremlin in Moscow. December 5, 2024. (Sputnik/Valery Sharifulin/Pool via REUTERS)